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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE TAXATION OF INDIAN PROPERTY
By

ROBERT C. BROWN*

N

oone can consider the status of the American Indians and
fail to remark on their peculiar and practically unique legal
position. The relation between these original inhabitants of our
country, who by changing circumstances are now in, but hardly of,
our nation, and the governments, state and federal, which we have
established, is completely impossible to define and almost equally
impossible to understand.1
Our dual system of state and nation rarely fails to confuse
any governmental problem, and it has not been without its customary affect on this one. The United States constitution makes
a few references to the Indians, 2 but these are not conclusive as
to the power and duty of governing them, as the Supreme Court
decided in United States v. Kaganz. 3 In this case, however, the
Court decided that the federal government had the full power to
govern the Indians .and that the states do not inherently have any
such power. The Court reached this conclusion not because of any
constitutional provision, but on a consideration of general policy
and the necessities of the case, saying:
"These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They
owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where
they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which
*Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana.
'See Thayer, A People Without Law, an article discussing the
peculiar legal position of the Indians, published in the Atlantic Monthly
in 1891, and reprinted in his "Legal Essays" at page 91. See also the article
by Ray A. Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, (1930) 39 Yale
L. J. 307, for an excellent discussion of contemporary administrative
problems in connection with the Indians.
2
Art. I, sec. 3, superseded by the fourteenth amendment, sec. 2,
both providing for the appointment of representatives among the
states according to numbers "excluding Indians not taxed;" Art 1, sec.
8, par. 3, giving Congress power "To regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
8(1886) 118 U. S. 375, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 30 L. Ed. 228.
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it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with
it the power. This has always been recognized by the executive
and by' Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen."

It is the federal government, then, and not the states, which is
to govern and protect the Indians; and this activity is a federal
function, as immune from improper state interference, by taxation
or otherwise, as any other federal function. It is the purpose of
this paper to consider the powers of taxing the Indians and their
property, not only by the states, but by the federal government,
and by the Indian tribes themselves.
In seeking to construct machinery for governing the Indians,
the federal government originally made large use of the Indian
tribes. These tribes are not now of such great importance, but
many of them still exist, continue to have some slight and subordinate governmental powers, and what is vastly more important,
still own, or at least exclusively occupy, large tracts of land. The
status of these tribes is itself a puzzling question. They are recognized by our government as something analogous to states, but
they are certainly not states in the international sense, and they are
not foreign states.5 In so far as they are permitted to exercise governmental powers, they are not bound by the provisions of the
federal constitution. But in this respect, and even as holders of
property, they act only in subordination to the national government,
which may take from them all powers and even their tribal property
without giving the tribes any right to legal redress.7
The present tendency is to do away with the tribal autonomy
and, so far as possible, to assimilate the Indians into our body
politic. For example, a recent statute has made all Indians born
within its territory, citizens of the United States.8 This is the
culmination of a long series of statutes which had already very
largely accomplished this result piecemeal. But, for such reasons
4(1886) 118 U. S. 375, 383, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 30 L. Ed. 228.
rThe Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, (1831) 5 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 8 L. Ed.
25; Worcester v. Georgia, (1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483.
GTalton v. Mayes, (1896) 163 U. S. 376, 16 Sup. Ct. 986, 41 L. Ed.
196. 7
Cherokee Nation v. So. Kansas Ry. Co., (1890) 135 U. S. 641,
10 Sup. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295, holding that Congress may authorize
a railroad to condemn a right of way through lands granted to an
Indian tribe, although the tribe had been granted not only the title
very full governmental powers over these lands.
but also
8
Act of June 2, 1924, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 3.
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as are set forth in the above quotation from United States v.
Kagamw,' the federal government has still to act with reference
to the Indians-to protect them, and sometimes to keep them in
order.'0 The full power of the United States over its Indian citizens
was definitely settled in the leading case of Tiger v. Western Investment Co.,"' where the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Day, said:
"It may be taken as the settled doctrine of this court that Congress, in pursuance of the long-established policy of the Government, has a right to determine for itself when the guardianship
which has been maintained over the Indian shall cease. It is for
that body and not for the courts, to determine when the true interests of the Indian require his release from such condition of
tutelage." 12
TE

FiEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS PROTECTOR OF THE INDIANS

As we have seen, the federal government considers itself as
the guardian of the Indians. No doubt this is a necessary relation,
as the Indians need protection both against the states, and not
infrequently against their own improvident action.' 3 The only
difficulty is that there is no superior authority to whom this particular guardian may be compelled to account, and the dealings
of our government with its Indian wards have not infrequently
amounted to what in the case of an ordinary guardian would be
both legally and morally a gross breach of trust. Against such
actions the Supreme Court has not felt itself able to protect the
Indians, but it has done what it could to insure justice, by construing all agreements between our government and the Indians
in favor of the latter. It is considered that the superior authority
can well afford to bear the burden of a strict construction against"
itself of its own necessarily somewhat arbitrary acts with respect
to an inferior race, particularly when that race is weaker not only
in legal position, but also in education and business ability. Thus,
it is a settled rule that Indian treaties will be construed as the
Indians themselves would have understood the language. 14 And
9(1886) 118 U. S. 375, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 30 L. Ed. 228.
' 0 See Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, (1930) 39 Yale

L. J.307.

1(1911) 221 U. S. 286, 31 Sup. Ct. 578, 55 L. Ed. 738.
12(1911) 221 U. S.286, 315, 31 Sup. Ct. 578, 55 L. Ed. 738.
IsEuropean nations who occupied portions of North America,
such as the Spanish and the French, recognized from very early times
that the Indians were not in a position to deal with white men on an
equal footing, and that they required special protection. See Chouteau
v. Molony, (1854) 16 How. (U.S.) 203, 14 L. Ed. 905.

TAXATION OF INDIAN PROPERTY

in legal controversies between the Indians and the United States,
all doubtful points are to be adjusted in favor of the former.15
Since the states have no power over the Indians, there is no rule
that the language of Congressional statutes giving rise to a controversy between the Indians and the states should likewise be
construed in favor of the Indians.' And it has also been held that
the principle of construction in favor of the Indians as against
the United States does not apply to a Congressional statute having
no features of an agreement."
One of the conspicuous phases of federal legislation for the
protection of the Indians has been in connection with intoxicating
liquor. Indeed, practically the entire scope of the exercise of the
power of Congress to regulate commerce "with the Indian
Tribes" ' has been in connection with endeavors to keep the white
man's "fire-water" away from the Indians, to whom, as has been
the case with so many primitive peoples, it has been particularly
destructive. Here the Supreme Court has sustained the most
stringent exercises of the federal power, and without requiring
attention to be paid to state rights, or even Indian rights of property. Thus, Congress has been held to have the power to prohibit
the sale of liquor to Indians living on land owned in fee by their
tribe.' So it may prohibit the introduction of liquor into an Indian reservation from a point within the state in which the reservation is situated, *so that interstate commerce is not involved.20
Nor does the admission of a state have any effect upon laws forbidding the sale of liquor to Indians living in the territory from
which the state was formed. 2' It has even been held that the
4
1 Jones
5

v. Meehan, (1899) 175 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 1, 44 L. Ed. 49.
2 Choctaw Nation v. United States, (1886) 119 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct.
75, 30
L. Ed. 306.
'0 See Goudy v. Meath, (1906) 203 U. S. 146, 27 Sup. Ct. 48, 51
L. Ed. 130.
17United States v. First National Bank, (1914) 234 U. S. 245, 34
Sup. Ct. 846, 58 L. Ed. 1298. It is submitted that this limitation is
unsound; the construction on doubtful points should be in favor of
the Indians under all possible situations. -No criticism can be made
of the decision in this particular case, as the terms of the Congressional statute were entirely clear; but the language of the court to which
attention has been called, seems unfortunate.
IsConstitution, art. I, sec. 8, par. 3.
' 0 United States v. Sandoval, (1913) 231 U. S. 28, 34 Sup. Ct. 1, 58
L. Ed.
20 107.
United States v. Wright, (1913) 229 U. S. 226, 33 Sup. Ct. 630,
57 L. Ed. 1160.
2hEx parte Webb, (1912) 225 U. S. 663, 32 Sup. Ct. 769, 56 L. Ed.
1248.
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federal government may constitutionally forbid the sale of liquor
in areas adjoining an Indian reservation, so that the Indians
will not be tempted by the close proximity of this forbidden beverage ;22 but it may well be doubted whether this extreme doctrine
23
would still be adhered to.

The eighteenth amendment to the constitution, and the Volstead Act, which have extended the protection against pollution
by intoxicating liquors from the lowly Indian to members of supposedly more intelligent races, have in a sense made all these
Indian liquor cases somewhat obsolete. However, they still have
certain importance as showing the wide powers which the federal
government has with respect to Indians, even those residing within
the limits of the states. It might seem that the states were likewise
powerless with respect to the taxation of Indians within their
borders, particularly since a federal instrumentality is involved
here. The rules against the burdening by the states of such an
instrumentality are much more stringent than when merely commerce is involved. As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in
24

Gillespie v. Oklahoma,

"The criterion of interference by the State with interstate
commerce is one of degree. It is well understood that a certain
amount of reaction upon and interference with such commerce
cannot be avoided if the States are to exist and make laws ...
The rule as to instrumentalities of the United States on the25 other
hand is absolute in form and at least stricter in substance.
This indicates quite correctly that the test is more severe here
than where only commerce is concerned. But where Indian commerce is concerned, the restrictions against state action are, or may
be made, absolute, in order to protect the Indians. It does not
22United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, (1876) 93 U. S. 188,

23 L.23 Ed. 846.

1n United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, (1876) 93 U. S. 188,
23 L. Ed. 846 the language of the court is sufficiently broad to cover
the proposition for which the case has been cited in the text; but in
fact the land had previously belonged to the Indians, and the treaty
under which it was taken over by the United States provided that the
land should remain subject to the federal laws forbidding the sale of
liquor. The subsequent case of Dick v. United States, (1908) 208
U. S. 340, 28 Sup. Ct. 399, 52 L. Ed. 520 followed the holding of the
Whiskey case, but repudiated its broad language just referred to. The
Dick Case held that the sale of liquor could be forbidden on the land
in question only because it had previously belonged to the Indians,
and the treaty by which the Indians relinquished their title so provided.
24(1922) 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. Ed. 338.
25(1922) 257 U. S. 501, 505, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. Ed. 338.
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follow that such protection requires entire freedom from taxation.
At any rate, this is a matter solely within the control of Congress. What the Indians need for protection against state action
-- or the action of the federal government-is to be determined
by Congress without any right of appeal to the courts. And what
Congress desires with respect to taxation or anything else it can
almost invariably secure, any injustice to the states or to the Indians themselves to the contrary notwithstanding.
For example, we may consider the matter of treaties. As already said, the government originally treated the Indian tribes
as separate states, in the sense that they could make war and
conclude treaties with the United States; and a large number of
such treaties were in fact made, many of which are still in effect.
In 1871 the government changed its policy by Congressional act
-without going through the useless formality of consulting the
Indians-and formally put an end to the negotiation of treaties
with the Indians (though existing treaties were not interfered
with) . 2 6 Professor Thayer expressed the.opinion that this statute
does not represent any fundamental change of policy, since in fact
agreements with Indian tribes continued to be made, so that the
real reason for the statute was to give the House of Representatives a share in the formulation of these agreements, which it
27
would not have had if they were called treaties.
But even the documents dignified by the name of treaties do
not accord any real protection to the Indians against the federal
government. It is true that in case of doubt Congressional legislation will be construed by the Court so as not to interfere with
existing Indian treaties. 28 But the power of Congress to abrogate
Indian treaties or, as is more usual, to proceed at its own discretion without any regard to the treaties is undoubted. 29 It may
perhaps be said that Indian treaties are in this respect like all
other treaties, which may no doubt be abrogated or intentionally
violated by one of the parties. But the practical difference is that
2625 U. S. C. A. sec. 71.
27
Thayer,
2

Legal Essays 116.
BLeavenworth, etc., Railroad Co. v. United States, (1876) 92
U. S. 733, 23 L. Ed. 634; Ex Parte Crow Dog, (1883) 109 U. S. 556,
3 Sup. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030. See also* United States v. Celestine,
215 U. S. 278, 30 Sup. Ct. 93, 54 L. Ed. 195.
(1909)
29
Thomas v. Gay, (1898) 169 U. S. 264, 18 Sup. Ct. 340, 42 L.
Ed. 740.
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a treaty with a state in the international sense cannot be broken
by our government without liability under international law
(whatever this may amount to), whereas Indian treaties may be
broken without any legal responsibility.
Cases may occur where the abrogation of an Indian treaty
But this .is a
is clearly for the best interests of the Indians.
political question, and one which is conclusively settled by Congress. 1 If the treaty is in fact disregarded, the Court does not
consider itself at liberty to pass on the motives of Congress, and
it is quite clear that gross injustice has not seldom resulted. Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock 2 is an example of the extreme limits to which
Congress may go in this particular. Here Congress authorized the
sale of Indian lands, which sale was in violation of an existing
treaty. Some members of the tribe whose lands were being sold
(but a less number than was required by the treaty) did sign an
agreement approving the sale, but these Indians claimed that they
had been induced to sign by fraud. Furthermore, Congress did
not even comply with the terms of the later agreement. But all
this, the Court held, raised no judicial question; the will of Congress over the Indians is supreme. It is not clear, of course, that
any real injustice was done to the Indians in this particular case,
but such arbitrary power of one party is certainly somewhat
dangerous.
In the case of Ward v. Race Horse,3 3 on the. other hand, it
seems that the Court permitted a gross injustice to Indians, for
which Congress was hardly to blame. Here a treaty with an Indian tribe gave them the right to hunt on all unoccupied lands
of the United States. Later, Wyoming, where these lands were,
was admitted as a state and the rights of the Indians were not
explicitly reserved. The state then passed a statute forbidding
such hunting, and the majority of the Supreme Court, speaking
by Mr. Justice White, held that this statute might be enforced
against the Indians, the admission of Wyoming having abrogated
the treaty. There is no doubt that Congress had power to do away
with the treaty, but it is submitted that its action required no such
3OStephens v. Cherokee Nation, (1899) 174 U. S. 445, 19 Sup. Ct.
722, 43 L. Ed. 1041.
3'United States v. Kagama, (1886) 118 U. S. 375, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109,
30 L. Ed. 228; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, (1902) 187 U. S. 294, 23
Sup. Ct. 115, 47 L. Ed. 183.
32(1903) 187 U. S. 553, 23 Sup. Ct. 216, 47 L. Ed. 299.
33(1896) 163 U. F,. 504, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244.
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construction, particularly in view of the usual policy of the Court
to construe doubtful acts of Congress in favor of the Indians.
The majority insisted that the United States had even a moral
right to abrogate the treaty because it gave rights only so long
as the land was owned by the government; but the government in
fact still owned the land where the hunting had been done. Besides, there seems to be no evidence of an intent by Congress to
take away the treaty rights of the Indians; the omission to reserve
them explicitly may more reasonably be regarded as a mere oversight, or that Congress regarded specific language to this effect as
unnecessary. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brown is
quite convincing, and it seems to reach a much fairer and more
desirable result.
But the Ward Case stands for the undoubted proposition that
the federal government may generally, as an exercise of its power
over the Indians, subject them to the jurisdiction of the state
within which they dwell. 3 On the other hand, the states have no
power to remove the Indians from federal jurisdiction and protection.35 They may confer upon the Indians such privileges to
participate in state government as they deem proper, but all this
does not abate in the slightest degree the power of the national
government.
In fact, Congress has provided for the government and the
protection of the Indians in a manner quite thorough, and, if properly administered, reasonably enlightened. Not only are there
regulations with respect to liquor, but there are other statutes
dealing with crimes against the Indians and to some extent by
them. 36 Even contracts with Indians are carefully supervised by
the national government so as to prevent overreaching of the
Indians.37 And there is an elaborate and, it is to be feared, somewhat bureaucratic organization under the administration of the
38
secretary of the interior, for the handling of Indian affairs. The
net result is that all Indian matters are within the jurisdiction of
34

See also United States v. McBatney, (1882) 104 U. S. 621, 26
L. Ed. 869.
arWorcester v. Georgia, (1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483;
Uhited States v. Holliday, (1866) 3 Wall. (U.S.) 407, 18 L. Ed. 182;
Donnelly v. United States, (1913) 228 U. S. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 57

L. Ed. 820.
3018 U. S. C. A. secs. 548-9.
3725 U. S. C. A. see. 81 ff.
3825 U. S. C. A. sec. 1-68.
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the federal government, and no others have any right to interfere
without its permission. This applies to taxation and everything
else.
THE INDIAN LAND SITUATION

In considering the question of Indian taxation, the status of the
land occupied by them must obviously be considered, since the
bulk of state taxation which would affect the Indians is on or
with respect to such land.
In the beginning, the Indians were regarded as having a mere
right of occupancy in the lands where they lived. 39 The title to
such lands was in the United States, so that the Indians could
not sell natural growths from such lands, though of course they
could dispose of any crops actually raised by them. 40 Under these
conditions, it would seem clear that the states would have no
power to lay any tax burdens upon this land, any more than they
could upon any other land owned and used by the federal government. The situation is not changed by the establishment of Indian reservations; these are still government owned lands as to
which the Indians have no rights enforceable against the gov41

ernment.

In recent years, however, many Indians have secured substantial ownership in tracts of land. As in most government dealings
with the Indians, the matter was done piece-meal, tribe by tribe,
or sometimes even by lesser units, so that a considerable number
of Indians owned land individually before the government recognized it as a definite policy as to all.
This change of policy was largely accomplished by the General
Allotment Act of 1887. This Act did not apply to all the Indians,
several tribes, including the Five Civilized Tribes inhabiting the
Indian Territory, which has since become a part of Oklahoma,
being omitted. However, it covered all Indian tribes except those
explicitly named, and provided for the allotment to individual
Indians of tracts of land for their own use. It was provided that
39Johnson v. M'Intosh, (1823) 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681;
591, 22 L. Ed. 210.
United
0 States v. Cook, (1873) 19 Wall. (U.S.)

441United States v. Cook, (1873) 19 Wall. (U.S.) 591, 22 L. Ed. 210.
1t is true that there are treaties and agreements purporting to
give certain tribes collective ownership of tracts of land occupied by
them. However, in view of the full powers to deal with such lands
assumed by the federal government, it would seem that the alleged
ownership by the Indian tribes is not to be regarded as having much
practical effect.
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the United States would retain title of these lands for a period
of 25 years after allotment, in trust for the allottee, who should
in the meantime be unable to alienate them without the consent of
the government. At the end of the twenty-five year period the
allottee should become the owner of the land, with all the rights
and duties of any other landowner in the state where the land is
situated. The federal government reserved power to extend the
trust period, if deemed desirable. Under this act, numerous allotments have been made, and large amounts of land are still held
by the federal government in trust for the respective allottees.
The other important kind of division for the benefit of Indians,
which concerns us here, is that typified by the Atoka Agreement
with the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes, made in 1897 and embodied in the Curtis Act passed the next year. These tribes were
two of the Five Civilized Tribes occupying parts of Indian Territory, 42 and, as already seen, not entitled to the benefits of the
General Allotment Act. Here there was a like provision for allotments of land to individual members of the tribes, but without
any provision for the United States holding legal title to the
allotted lands in trust. There were, however, certain restrictions
on alienation of the lands. It was also provided that "all the
lands allotted shall be non-taxable while the title remains in the
original allottee, but not to exceed twenty-one years from date of
patent."
The foregoing covers the situation of the bulk of the land now
occupied by Indians. Such land is either owned (legally or at
least in substance) by the United States and occupied by Indian
tribes, ov else has been allotted to individual Indians under the
General Allotment Act, the Atoka Agreement, or similar legislation. At one time the Supreme Court seemed to be trying to make
a special rule for the New Mexico Pueblos. In United States v.
Joseph, 43 it was held that land of such a Pueblo was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Court said that these
Indians were civilized, that the Pueblos owned the land under
title derived from Spain before the United States obtained jurisdiction of the territory, and that their rights were prior to those
of the federal government and to be enforced in the courts of
2

Somewhat similar arrangements were made with the other Civilized Tribes.
4.3(877) 94 U. S. 614, 24 L. Ed. 295. See also United States v.
4

Pico, (1867) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 536, 18 L. Ed. 695.
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the territory, like those of any landowner. It is said that this
peculiar rule applied only to highly civilized Indians, and probably
to none but Pueblo Indians, with the possible exception of certain
Indians living in the state of New York.
It is not believed that this attempt of the Court to keep certain Indians immune from federal control has been successful.
Indeed, the authority of the Joseph Case is greatly diminished by
the more recent case of United States v. Sandozval,44 holding that
Congress may prohibit sales of liquor to New Mexico Pueblo Indians. In support of its conclusion the Court quoted much material
from reports of Indian agents to show that these Pueblo Indians
were very ignorant and degraded. The Court practically admitted that it had been mistaken as to the facts concerning these
Pueblo Indians when it made the decision in the Joseph Case, and
so limited that case as to make it practically of no effect. It is
clear that for all practical purposes there are now only two classes
of Indian lands-those owned by the government and occupied
by tribes or parts of tribes, and land allotted to individual Indians.
RESTRICTIONS ON ALIENATION OF INDIAN LANDS

But more important, from the consideration of taxation, than
the technical question of ownership, is that of the power of alienation. It is obvious that this has a very close relation to taxation.
If land can be freely alienated, it is presumptively subject to taxation, or at least there is no reason to suppose that there is any implied exemption. But if a legal restriction upon alienation is imposed, particularly when, as in the case of Indians, the restriction is primarily to protect the owners from their own ignorance
and improvidence, the restriction goes a long way toward implying exemption from taxation. Otherwise, the restriction upon voluntary alienation is likely to be ineffective-the person protected
from losing his land through his voluntary alienation is just as
likely to lose it in fact through an involuntary alienation under
state authority, because of non-payment of taxes.
The power of the federal government to restrict or prohibit
alienation of lands owned by Indians is undoubted. It is true that
no restrictions on alienation are implied merely because the owner
of the land is an Indian; they must be express. 45 But if an ex44(1913) 231 U. S. 28, 34 Sup. Ct. 1, 58 L. Ed. 107.
45
Doe v. Wilson, (1859) 23 How. (U.S.) 457, 16 L. Ed. 584.
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press limitation upon alienation is imposed by Congress upon
Indian land, it is valid even though the Indian owner is a United
States citizen." Furthermore, the period of restriction may be
extended by Congress, and this power may be delegated to an
executive officer.17 But of course such restrictions cannot be made
retroactive, so as to invalidate a conveyance made by an Indian
before the restriction has been imposed."8
It is obvious that this power includes that of permitting alienation upon such terms as Congress or the federal officer delegated
with the power deems advisable from the standpoint of the protection of the Indians. Such conditions are rigidly construed in
order fully to protect the Indians. Thus in United States V.
Noble,"' an Indian allottee of land was forbidden to alienate it
for twenty-five years, but in the meantime was permitted to make
mining leases for not exceeding ten years. It was held that assignments by him of rent to be received under mining leases which
he had made were wholly invalid, and that leases for the full ten
year period made during an existing lease to take effect at its
expiration were also void. The Court considered that both of
these expedients involved an alienation which was broader in effect
than the kind permitted. Likewise, it was held in Sunzderland v.
United States,-0 where the secretary of the interior had been delegated with authority to permit alienations by Indians notwithstanding a general prohibition of alienations by Congress, that
he might permit alienation of some land by an Indian and that
when the proceeds were used in the purchase of other land he
might insist that this latter land should be under the same restriction against alienation as that previously owned, and accordingly
that a sale of the substituted land by the Indian was invalid.
Obviously, the states will be compelled to recognize and give
effect to these federal restrictions against the alienation of Indian land. Thus, in Bunch v. Cole, 1 an Indian had made a lease
not complying with the restrictions of a federal statute. When
he sued in the state court to set aside the lease and recover the
"OTiger v. Western Investment Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 286, 31 Sup.
Ct. 578, 55 L. Ed. 738; Brader v. James, (1918) 246 U. S. 88, 38 Sup.

62 L. Ed. 591.
Ct. 285,
4

7United States v. Jackson, (193G) 280 U. S. 183, 50 Sup. Ct. 143.

4"Wilson v. Wall, (1868) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 83, 18 L. Ed. 727.
41(1915) 237 U. S. 74, 35 Sup. Ct. 532, 59 L. Ed. 844.
ro(1924) 266 U. S. 226, 45 Sup. Ct. 64, 69 L. Ed. 259.
5-1(1923) 263 U. S. 250, 44 Sup. Ct. 101, 68 L. Ed. 290.
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profits, he was met by a state statute which, as construed by the
state court, treated the lease as a tenancy at will, and so denied
him recovery of the profits earned by the lessee. On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, this decision was reversed,
that Court holding that the state statute as thus construed is unconstitutional, and that the lease must not be given effect for any
purpose whatever. But, on the other hand, where federal restrictions have been removed, the government has nothing further
to do with the matter, and the right of the Indians to set aside
their conveyances, if any, is solely in accordance with the state
law.

52

That this condition of the law sometimes gives rise to rather
peculiar results is shown by the recent decision in Sperry Oil &
Gas Co. v. Chisholm.53 Here an Indian had been allotted a tract
of eighty acres, of which thirty acres was designated as a homestead. At that time he had no power to convey the land except
with the consent of the secretary of the interior, but he later leased
the entire tract with the'consent of the secretary. Later still, all
restrictions on alienation of the fifty acres outside the homestead
were removed. Subsequently, the Indian allottee, who had in the
meantime married, executed .a renewal lease of the whole 80
acres, his wife not joining. The secretary of the interior approved
the renewal lease so far as the homestead was concerned, but
quite naturally took no action with respect to the other fifty acres.
By the state law, the lease was wholly invalid because not joined
in by the wife, and in fact the state constitution explicitly provided
that nu federal law should deprive any Indian or other allottee
of the benefit of the homestead law of the state.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the lease of the homestead property, having been made in accordance with the laws of
the United States, was valid; that the state laws could not have
any effect upon it. But as to the other fifty acres, all restrictions
on alienation by federal law having been repealed, it was subjected
to the state law, and since the renewal lease was invalid by that
law, it should be set aside. The result of sustaining the lease
upon the homestead property where the federal government was
52United States v. Waller, (1917) 243 U. 'S. 452, 37 Sup. Ct. 430,
61 L. Ed. 843; Larkin v. Paugh, (1928) 276 U. S. 431, 48 Sup. Ct. 366,
72 L. Ed. 640. See also United States v. First National Bank, (1914)
234 U. S. 245, 34 Sup. Ct. 846, 58 L. Ed. 1298.
58(1924) 264 U. S. 488, 44 Sup. Ct. 372, 69 L. Ed. 803.
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still enforcing restrictions, and setting it aside as to the other
land where all federal restrictions had been removed, seems certainly very curious; but it is strictly in accordance with the settled
principle that federal regulation of the alienation of Indian land
prevails over state rules, but that when such regulation is given
up by the national government, the land comes entirely under the
laws of the state.
AUTHORITIES WITH RESPECT TO TAXATION

The discussion of the rules with respect to the alienation of
Indian land, which has just been-concluded, is particularly apposite in connection with state taxation of such property. But before
passing to this subject, it will be convenient to consider the power
of taxation of the Indians themselves, and of the federal government.
As for the Indians, it is obvious that no powers of taxation
can exist except with the consent of the federal government, express or implied. Such powers are undoubtedly given to some
extent to certain tribes, though they are exercised only subject to
the supervision of the government. Apparently the only case of
this sort which has actually come before the Court is Morris v.
Hitchcock, 4 where it appeared that Congress had by the Curtis
Act permitted the Cherokee Indians to pass laws for the governing of their territory, subject to the approval of the president of
the United States. They passed an act imposing heavy taxes upon
cattle grazing in their country, and this act was approved by the
president. The statute was upheld by the Court as tending to keep
from the Cherokee country people whom the Indians did not want
there. This, it will be noted, was only in form a taxation measure;
it was actually a police measure for a purpose distinctly approved
by the national government. The problem of the taxation of Indians and others by Indians is thus not a particularly difficult or
important one; it is only a question of the wishes of the national
government.
Much more important is the question of the federal taxation
of Indians. Here there is certainly no question of power, and in
fact it is generally held that Indians are subject to taxation under
the federal Revenue Acts, except where there are specific exemp54(1904) 194 U. S. 384, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. Ed. 1030.
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tions, such as the exemption of incorhe from allotted lands.", Even
here, the Indian seems to be compelled to stand upon his own
feet, and take the same precautions as any other taxpayer, since
it has been held that an Indian who pays federal taxes upon income
from allotted land is barred from recovering the taxes if he fails
to claim refund within the time specified in the Revenue Act.58
In The Cherokee Tobacco,5" a treaty with the Cherokee Nation
provided that the Indians of that tribe might sell their products
free from any United States tax. Later a federal statute imposed
a tax upon all tobacco grown within the boundaries of the United
States, whether in a collection district or not. It was held that
the statute superseded the treaty, and so the tobacco produced by
the Cherokees was taxable. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Bradley argued with considerable force that the treaty should
not be considered to have been abrogated by a merely general
statute; but there was no dispute as to the power of Congress
to impose this or any other taxes upon Indians, which could be
constitutionally imposed upon white men similarly situated.
On the other hand a strong argument of policy can be made
against imposing burdensome federal taxation upon the Indians.
If the Indians are wards of the United States and therefore entitled to special protection, it would seem that their guardian
should be very chary in taxing them. But thus far the Court has
not given much weight to this argument. In Heiner v. Lewellyn,58
the Court held that the white lessee of Indian allotted lands was
subject to federal income tax. Of course, this is an easier casethan the taxation of the incomes of the Indians themselves, although if one is disposed to carry the protection of the Indians
to such an extreme length, it might well be said that their lessees
should be exempted from taxation, so that the Indians would be
able to lease their lands upon better terms. But Mr. Justice
Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected this idea, and
intimated a decided opinion that the Indians themselves were
55
See the rulings of 'the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and decisions
of the Board of Tax Appeals, collected in Commerce Clearing House

1929 Supplement to Consolidated United States Income Tax Laws,
page 338.
56United States v. Richards, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d)
284, certiorari denied, (1928) 278 U. S. 630, 49 Sup. Ct. 29, 73 L. Ed.
548.
" (1871) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 616, 20 L. Ed. 227.
5s8(1927) 275 U. S. 232, 48 Sup. Ct. 65, 72 L. Ed. 256.
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taxable upon their own income. It was argued in favor of the
white taxpayers, on the basis of cases to be hereafter considered,
that such income could not be taxed by the states. The Court conceded this, but stated that any restrictions on the states had no
application to the federal government.
The result of these authorities seems fairly clear. The federal
government has full power to tax the Indians directly, or indirectly by taxing those who lease Indian property. Whatever
arguments there are against imposing such taxation are purely
matters of policy, for the consideration of Congress alone. The
Court will sustain any federal taxation upon or with respect to
Indians which it would sustain if they were white men.
But the states are in quite a different position, and their
powers of taxation of Indians are much more limited. Attempts
by them to impose taxation which will burden the Indians within
their borders are apt to run foul of the principle that the states
may not tax federal instrumentalities-or, to put what is essentially the same thing so far as this particular matter is concerned, such taxation may be considered to take from the Indians
the protection which it is the business of the federal government
to accord.
Of course the states may by agreement limit their power to
tax Indians, and this without regard to the power and duty of the
federal government to protect. An attempt by the state to take
away such an agreed exemption may, however, come before the
Supreme Court under the allegation that the state is violating the
contract clause of the federal constitution. 9 But this is not a
particularly important doctrine because of the settled rule that
tax exemptions are strictly construed.
The matter of state taxation of Indian reservations is very
simple, and indeed does not seem to have been affirmatively litigated. There can be no doubt that such taxation is beyond the
power of the state-if for no other reason, because reservation
land is property of the United States, used for the federal function of protecting the Indians.
But a somewhat different line of reasoning was used in the
leading case of The Kansas Indians.60 The Court here spoke
of the tribal lands as belonging to the tribe. In a sense this was
59

New Jersey v. Wilson, (1812) 7 Cr. (U.S.) 164, 3 L. Ed. 303.
60(1867) 5 Wall (U.S.) 737, 18 L. Ed. 667.
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true, since the land had been granted to the tribe by a treaty
with the United States. There was the additional and extremely important fact that many of the members of the tribe had
received patents of lands in severalty (but with restrictions against
alienation) and these individual holdings were to a large extent
interspersed among holdings of white men.
The Court decided that none of this Indian land, whether
held in common by the tribe, or in severalty by individuals, was
subject to state taxation. The reasoning was that the tribe was
a distinct people, not in any way subject to the state laws. This
of course involves the question of the nature of the Indian tribes,
which has already been considered; here they were treated as
states in such sense as to be immune from the laws of the member of the federal union within whose boundaries they were located. The taxing authorities argued that the distribution of the
Indian holdings among white holdings, and the consequent mingling of the races, showed that the tribe had ceased to exist. But
to this the Court answered:
"The action of the political department of the government
settles, beyond controversy, that the Shawnees are as yet a distinct
people, with a perfect tribal organization
.
While the general government has a superintending care over their interests,
and continues to treat them as a nation, 61the State of Kansas is

estopped from denying their title to it."

The same doctrine was followed in The New York Indians,62
where it was held that the state could not tax tribal lands which
had been sold by the Indians, but were still in their possession
pending their removal to the West-which was likely to take
several years.63 The state statute contained a proviso that no tax
sale should affect the right of the Indians to occupy the land, but
this was held not to save it, since the Court felt that such sales
might lead to the disturbance of the Indians by unauthorized
persons.
The Court thus forbids anything which can possibly be construed as state taxation of tribal lands. Where, however, the
tribe has ceased to exist as such within the state, lands owned b
Indians formerly members of the tribe are subject to state taxation
63(1867) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 737, 756, 18 L. Ed. 667.
62(1867) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 761, 18 L. Ed. 708.

63
See Fellows v. Blacksmith, (1857)
Ed. 684.

19 How. (U.S.) 366, 15 L.
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unless forbidden by some other federal law." And even an
Indian reservation does not continue to be exempt from taxation
when no longer owned by the federal government nor used by the
Indians. Thus, a railroad right of way procured by the consent of
Congress through a reservation is subject to state taxation. 5
As has been said, the immunity of the Indians and their property from state taxation extends much further than tribal lands;
it applies wherever the tax is considered by the Court to burden
an instrumentality of the federal government for the protection
of the Indians and the regulation of their affairs.66 But a purely
charitable institution not under government supervision, although
in fact devoting its entire resources and 'activities to the help of
the Indians, cannot claim to be a federal instrumentality, so as to
have the same tax immunity.6 7 And apparently a federal instrumentality for dealing with Indian matters may be subjected to
liability to an assessment for improvements benefitting its property-such assessment being in theory not a tax but rather a payment for benefits conferred.'
While liability to state taxation has been considered by the
Court as having some bearing as to whether or not a particular
Indian has become a United States citizen,6 9 yet it is clear that the
fact that all Indians are now United States citizens does not of
itself subject them to state taxation. This does not remove them
70
from the jurisdiction and protection of the federal government.
It is entirely clear that many Indians are still ignorant and degraded, and that the subjecting of them to ordinary tax burdens
would probably mean the loss of all their property, and the result04Pennock v. Commissioners, (1881) 103 U. S. 44, 26 L. Ea. 367.
GrMaricopa, etc., Railroad Co. v. Arizona, (1895) 156 U. S. 347,
Ct. 391, 39 L. Ed. 447.
15 Sup.
66
Choctaw, etc., Railroad Co. v. Harrison, (1914) 235 U. S. 292,
35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. Ed. 234.
O7Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, (1906) 200 U. S.
118, 26 Sup. Ct. 197, 50 L. Ed. 398.
GsChoctaw, etc., Railroad Co. v. Mackey, (1921) 256 U. S. 531,
41 Sup. Ct. 582, 65 L. Ed. 1076. The court, however, puts its decision
partly on the ground that the railroad, which had been built originally
for the purpose of developing Indian lands, had become part of a
through line, and so was now less clearly to be considered as a governmental instrumentality for the assistance of the Indians.
v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U. S. 94, 5 Sup. Ct. 41, 28 L. Ed. 643.
7-Elk
0 Hallowell
v. United States, (1911) 221 U. S. 317, 31 Sup. Ct.
587, 55 L. Ed. 750; United States v. Nice, (1916) 241 U. S. 591, 36
Sup. Ct. 696, 60 L. Ed. 1192, overruling Matter of Heff, (1905) 197

U. S. 488, 25 Sup. Ct. 506, 49 L. Ed. 848.
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ing poverty and dependence, which only the careful protection of
71
the national government can avoid.
On the other hand, there must be some methods by which the
Indians can be subjected to state taxation. To give them even
such restricted immunity as is now allowed is undoubtedly one of
the causes for their frequent local unpopularity. But this is unavoidable, though Thayer suggested that the federal government
should pay the local taxes on Indian property 7 2-a suggestion
which naturally was not regarded with favor by Congress. But
certainly a time must come when the Indians no longer need
the crutches of tax exemption.
As has been said, this is closely connected with the question
of alienation. Where all restrictions on this power of the Indians
have been removed, the result is presumptively to subject these
same Indians to local taxation. As the Court said in Goudy v.
Meath :
"That Congress may grant the power of voluntary sale, while
withholding the land from taxation or forced alienation, may be
conceded. .

.

. But while Congress may make such provision, its

intent to do so should be clearly manifested, for the purpose of
the restriction upon voluntary alienation is protection of the Indian from the cunning and rapacity of his white neighbors, and
it would seem strange to withdraw this protection and permit the
Indian to dispose of his lands as he pleases, while at the same
.time releasing it from taxation. In other words, that the officers
of a state enforcing its laws cannot be trusted to do justice, aland every individual acting for himself may be so
though each
7'4
trusted.

It follows that the removal of restrictions on alienation ordinarily means subjection to state taxation, and not infrequently
Congress has explicitly so provided. There would seem to be
no difficulty in the proposition that Congress,,in its plenary power
over the Indians, can not only protect them from7 5state taxation,
but also may in*its discretion subject them thereto.
But an important limitation of this principle appears in
7'See United States v. Sandoval, (1913) 231 U. S.28, 34 Sup. Ct.
1, 58 L. Ed. 107; Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, (1926) 271 U. S. 609,
46 Sup.
72 Ct. 592, 70 L. Ed. 1112.
Thayer, Legal Essays 127.
73(1906) 203 U. S.146, 27 Sup. Ct. 48, 51 L. Ed. 130.
74(1906)
203 U. S.146, 149, 27 Sup. Ct. 48, 51 L. Ed. 130.
75
Sweet v. Schock, (1917) 245 U. S. 192, 38 Sup. Ct. 101, 62 L.
Ed. 237; Funk v. County Commissioners, (1919) 248 U. "S.399, 39
Sup. Ct. 128, 63 L. Ed. 324.
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Choate v. Trapp.6 Here the Atoka Agreement was involved,
and this, as already shown, provided for non-taxability for twentyone years, if the land remained in the hands of the original
allottee that long. It was made alienable in part before that time,
but the non-taxability was not to be lost unless the privilege of
alienation was actually availed of. Very soon after the Agreement was made, Oklahoma, where the lands were, was admitted
as a state (in fact, this had been the chief purpose of the Agreement), and Congress promptly followed this measure by another
which subjected the allotted lands to local taxation.
The question involved in this case was the constitutionality
of this latter measure. The Court unanimously held it invalid,
and that the Indians were entitled to the tax exemption set forth
in the Atoka Agreement. It was held that the Agreement constituted a contract and that the latter statute was an abrogation of
the contract. There is no specific provision in the constitution
forbidding the federal government to pass laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, as there is in the case of the states ;77
but the Court held that such action was in violation of the fifth
amendment, as depriving the Indians of their property without
due process of law.
Conceding the soundness of this position, yet the obvious
question still remains why, in view of the full power over the
Indians which the Government has, it could not take this action.
The Court met this point by distinguishing tribal and private
property, saying:
"The tribes have been regarded as dependent nations, and
treaties with them have been looked upon not as contracts, but
as public laws which could be abrogated at the will of the United
States. .

.

. But there is a broad distinction between tribal prop-

erty and private property, and between the power to abrogate a
statute and the authority to destroy rights acquired under such
law. s
For all that, the result of the case is somewhat surprising. The
authority of Congress had not previously been supposed to have
been less sweeping in the case of the individual Indian than in
the case of the tribe. No doubt, most Congressional interferences
with individual Indians had been for their benefit, but this had not
76(1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct 565, 56 L. Ed. 941.
77
Art. I, sec. 10, par. 1.
7a(1912) 224 U. S. 665, 671, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L. Ed. 941.
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previonsly been supposed to be a judicial question. At any rate,
the case stands for the proposition that the federal government
may not take away an exemption from state taxes given to individual Indians, and upon which they have relied. It has also
been held that where such taxes had been exacted from Indians
they may recover them from the officials to whom they made
payment, although the payment cannot be proved to have been
made under duress.O Where, however, an Indian secures permission to alienate land previously inalienable, which permission is
coupled with a condition that the land shall be subject to taxation
in the hands of the transferee, the condition is valid and 'enforceable.""
The question suggests itself as to whether Choate v. Trapp"
82
has any application to federal taxes. If The Cherokee Tobacco
is to be regarded as still authoritative, it would seem not, since
it was held in the Tobacco Case that the federal government
could revoke a tax exemption previously accorded to the Indians
even though the period for such exemption had not yet expired.
Yet it seems extremely hard to reconcile the reasoning in these
two cases, and the Choate Case would seem to offer an opportunity
for presenting a strong argument to the Court that a denial by
Congress of an exemption from federal taxes previously promised
to individual Indians would constitute a violation of the fifth
amendment. Perhaps this is largely a theoretical question, since
it is probable that no such promises will be made. And it seems
not improbable that even if the case were presented, the Court
would adhere to its reasoning in The Cherokee Tobacco, since it
could reasonably be held that the power of the federal government over the Indians is still unlimited when it alone is concerned,
even though it is limited when it seeks to subject them to the
power of the states.
Passing now to the question what Indian property is exempt
from state taxation, it is clear, of course, that allotments made
under the General Allotment Act are thus exempt, so long as the
land is held in trust by the United States.83 Unlike the Atoka
79Ward

Ed. 751.

v. Love County, (1920) 253 U. S. 17, 40 Sup. Ct. 419, 64 L.

soSweet v. Schock, (1917) 245 U. S. 192, 38 Sup. Ct. 101, 62 L. Ed.
Funk v. County Commissioners, (1919) 248 U. S. 399, 39 Sup.
Ct. 128, 63 L. Ed. 324.
81(1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L. Ed. 941.
82(1871) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 616, 20 L. Ed. 227.
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Agreement, there is no express provision for such exemption,
but it is specified that at the end of the trust period the United
States will convey legal title to the allottee of all lands to which
he is then entitled "free from all charge or incumbrance"-a
promise which could not be fulfilled if the land was subject to
tax incumbrances. It is also held that permanent improvements
upon restricted allotted lands are free from taxation, although
such improvements are personal property according to the state
law. And even personal property-usually live stock-furnished
by the Government for use on the land is also exempt from local
84
taxation.
On the other hand, cattle and other live stock not owned by
Indians but being grazed on their land by their permission, are
Here it could be argued that permitsubject to local taxation.8
ting such local taxation burdens the Indians in the use of their
lands, since they could probably obtain better terms from those
with whom they contract if they were able to offer them the advantage of tax exemption for their stock. The Court, however,
considers that this advantage is too remote. Besides, there must
certainly be some limit to the advantages which can properly be
given to the Indians at the expense of the states.
But it does not follow.that persons who deal with Indians for
the use of Indian property are never entitled to take advantage
of the tax exemption to which the property is entitled. Thus, in
8
the state imChoctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. R. v. Harrison,
posed a tax on gross sales of coal mined by the plaintiff from
Indian land held under the Atoka Agreement. It was held that
such a tax was invalid as imposing a direct burden upon an instrumentality of the United States. The Court stated, however,
that a tax upon the stock of coal as personal property would have
been sustained.
But this last dictum was repudiated in Jaybird Mining Co. v.
Weir,s7 where it was held that ore taken from restricted Indian
83United States v. Rickert, (1903) 188 U. S. 432, 23 Sup. Ct. 478,
47 L. Ed. 532. But where leases of unallotted Indian lands, whether
or not within reservations, are made, the production is subject to state
25 U. S. C. A. secs. 398 and 398e.
taxation.
84United States v. Rickert, (1903) 188 U. S. 432, 23 Sup. Ct. 478,
47 L.85 Ed. 532.
Thomas v. Gay, (1898) 169 U. S. 264, 18 Sup. Ct. 340, 42 L.
Ed. 740. Wagoner v. Evans, (1898) 170 U. S. 588, 18 Sup. Ct. 730,

42 L. Ed. 1154.

86(1914) 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. Ed. 234.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

property under the terms of a governmental lease was not subject, while in the hands of the lessee, to the ordinary state property tax. The court relied upon the fact that the Indian owner
had a certain interest in the ore for his royalty; but it cannot be
that a tax levied upon the ore would have diminished this royalty.
The only way to support the decision is to say that the Government, by offering to the lessee freedom from property taxes upon
the products, could thereby make better terms for its Indian ward.
It would seem that this argument is pretty far-fetched, practically
as much so as the benefit which the Indians might obtain by
securing exemption from state taxation of the live stock belonging
to white men, which they permitted to graze on their land; and
this benefit was considered too remote by the Court. In the
Jaybird Case, Mr. Justice McReynolds, who had written the opinion of the Court in Choctaw, Oklahota & Gulf R. R. Co. v. Harrison,s s dissented in a very brief opinion, stating that he thought
the burden upon the federal instrumentality too remote; Mr.
Justice Brandeis also dissented in -a much longer and rather convincing opinion. The case shows a determination by the Court
to carry the exemption of allotted Indian lands from state taxation, as long as such exemption lasts, to its extreme limit.
Another problem, which does not seem to be precisely covered
by the cases, is that of the taxability by local authorities of personal property owned by lessees of Indian land but used by them
in developing the land. Examples of this sort of property are
mining machinery and oil well equipment. This is not so clear a
case for exemption as the actual products from the land, but it
seems to be a stronger case than that of live stock pastured on the
land. While it is, at best, a matter of speculation, it would seem
that this situation is a trifle closer to the ore case, since this machinery is necessary in order to make any use of the leased property, and so its exemption would have a direct effect in enabling
the Government to make better terms for its Indian wards. Therefore, it seems likely that the Court would apply the analogy of
the Jaybird Case here, and would hold such machinery nontaxable.
A somewhat similar case to those just considered is Indian
Oil Co. v. Oklahoma.89 Here Indian land containing gas and oil
87(1926) 271 U. S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct. 592, 70 L. Ed. 1112.
88(1914) 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. Ed. 234.
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was leased to the plaintiff for exploitation of these mineral resources, the lease providing for the payment of royalties to the
Indian owners, and being approved by the secretary of the interior.
The plaintiff was a domestic corporation of Oklahoma, where the
land was. In assessing the franchise tax of the plaintiff, which
was based upon the value of its property, the state included the
value of this lease. This tax was sustained by the state supreme
court, on the theory that the lease was subject to state taxation.
On rehearing, that court adhered to its former result, but on a
different basis, holding that the lease was not taxable as property,
but that the company was taxable on the full value of its capital
stock, including in such value the value of the lease.
This decision was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court, which held that the lease was an instrumentality of the
United States, and could not be taxed either by including it as a
part of the property furnishing the basis for computing the franchise tax, or by taxing the full value of its capital stock, which
included the lease. It will be noted that neither form of taxation was, strictly speaking, a direct tax upon the lease, and that
the result was that the state would have to deduct the value of
the lease if it computed the franchise tax upon the basis of the
value of the stock of the company, even though, as quite frequently
happens, the market value of the stock did not reflect the value of
the assets of the corporation.
But the Court has gone still farther and has held in Gillespie
v. Oklahoma90 that a state may not even tax the net income of
the lessee from restricted Indian lands, on the ground that such a
tax would hamper the United States from making the best terms
possible for its Indian wards. The Court conceded that such a tax
upon an instrumentality of interstate commerce would be sustained, but, as already shown, drew a distinction between interstate
commerce and federal instrumentality cases. This was not a
matter of real difficulty, but the Court was apparently more
troubled to distinguish tle cases holding that live stock of white
men grazing on Indian lands with Indian permission was subject
to state taxation. It merely said that such taxation "obviously is
more remote." The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Holmes,
Justices Pitney, Brandeis, and Clark dissenting without opinion.
89(1916) 240 U. S. 522, 36 Sup. Ct. 453, 60 L. Ed. 779.
90(1924) 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. Ed. 338.
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Since net income of lessees of restricted Indian land is nontaxable by the states, it would seem clear that their gross income
is likewise exempt. A tax upon gross income is more burdensome
than one upon net income. But the only actual decision upon the
point is with respect to the Indians themselves. Oklahoma imposes a tax upon lessors of oil and gas property of 3%o of the
gross royalties received. The Court decided in the recent case of
Carpenter v. Shaw9 that such a tax cannot apply to Indians
holding land under the Atoka Agreement, the provision in that
Agreement that the allotted land shall be non-taxable for a certain
period being construed by the Court to include a tax upon income
from the leasing of the land.
The only remaining question is with respect to the taxation of
property bought by Indians with the proceeds of property itself
exempt. In McCurdy v. United States,92 it was held that land
purchased by an Indian from money distributed by the national
government from a trust fund held by it for the benefit of his
tribe was itself subject to state taxation. The Court considered
that Congress had not evidenced any intention to exempt such land,
and left open the question as to whether it was within its power to
do so.
Perhaps not much more is added by Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser
Oil Corporatian 3 Here land was purchased for an Indian minor
by his guardians, using royalties from a departmental lease of
his restricted allotted lands. The secretary of the interior approved the purchase, but with a proviso that the land should not be
alienated or leased for a considerable period without the approval
of the secretary. This restriction on alienation is valid.9 4 But
the Court here held that the secretary had not attempted to relieve
the land thus purchased with the income from tax exempt royalties from state taxation; nor had he power to do so. To the
argument that state taxation of such land would be a burden upon
a federal instrumentality, the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Stone, answered:
"In a broad sense all lands which the Indians are permitted to
purchase out of the taxable lands of the state in this process of
91(1930) 280 U.
92(1918) 246 U.
93(1928) 276 U.
. 4 Sunderland v.
64, 69 L. Ed. 259.

S. 363, 50 Sup. Ct. 121.
S. 263, 38 Sup. Ct. 289, 62 L. Ed. 706.
S. 575, 48 Sup. Ct. 333, 72 L. Ed. 709.
United States, (1924) 266 U. S.226, 45 Sup. Ct.
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their emancipation and assumption of the responsibility of citizenship, whether restricted or not, .may be said to be instrumentalities in that process. But they are far less intimately connected
with the performance of an essential governmental function than
were the restricted allotted lands, and the accomplishment of
their purpose obviously does not require entire independence of
state control in matters of taxation. To hold them immune would
be inconsistent with one of the very purposes of their creation,
to educate the Indians in responsibility, and would present the
curious paradox that the secretary by a mere conveyancer's restriction, permitted by Congress, had rendered the land free
from taxation and thus actually relieved the Indians of all responsibility. There are some instrumentalities which, though Congress
nevertheless be subject
may protect them from state taxation, will
95
to that taxation unless Congress speaks."
One would gather from this language that the Court feels that
it is within the power of Congress to exempt from state taxation
land purchased by or for Indians from the earnings of land which
was itself not subject to such taxation. It is clear, however, that
very explicit language to this effect will be required, and that
something more than mere restrictions on alienation will be required, even though such restrictions on alienation would be sufficient to show Congressional intent of freedom from state taxation in the case of the originally allotted land. It is likewise
clear that Congress is not likely to enact such clear provisions for
tax exemption, the general policy at the present time being to remove such tax exemptions as rapidly as possible, both in the
interest of the states and even of the Indians themselves, as encouraging them to stand on their own feet, and become self-supporting. Therefore, land purchased from exempt income by
Indians probably can be, but is not and almost certainly will not
be, exempted from state taxation.
CONCLUSION

The result is that all taxation of Indians is within the discretion
of the federal government. That government has power to impose the same taxes upon Indians that it does upon other persons.
To what extent it shall exercise that power is not a judicial question, though it would seem that under the analogy of ClWate v.
Trapp,98 a tax imposed in violation of an express agreement with
95(1928) 276 U. S. 575, 580, 48 Sup. Ct. 333, 72 L. Ed. 709.
06(1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L. Ed. 941.
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the Indians might possibly (but not probably) be held to be in
violation of the fifth amendment.
At any rate, it is clear that the Indians may be entirely exempted from state and local taxation and also from tribal taxation, if
the federal government so desires. The government may also,
at its discretion, subject them to state taxation, except that it may
not do so where there is a contract with the Indians, for which
they have given consideration, exempting them from such liability.
If by federal law all restraints on alienation have been removed,
that is sufficient to show an intent to subject them to state taxation, unless, of course, there is an explicit provision to the contrary,
as in the Atoka Agreement.
While the exemption from local taxation continues, it is given
very broad scope. So far as the Indians themselves are concerned, it covers not only their land, but also personal property
used in connection with it, and also the income derived by them
from the land. And lessees of Indian land are exempt from
taxation upon the leases, whether the taxation be direct or indirect. They are likewise exempt from taxation on the income
from such lands, irrespective of whether the tax is measured by
gross or net income. Furthermore, such lessees are not subject
to ordinary property taxes upon the products of Indian land,
although they are held not to be exempt from local taxation on
live stock grazed on Indian lands. This principle would seem to
extend to all property brought by them on the land merely for
safe-keeping or nurture, as distinguished from property like mining machinery, which is brought on the land. for the purpose of
developing it, and which is probably exempt from local taxation.
The basis for all these exemptions is that the leases and the lessees
themselves are federal instrumentalities for benefiting the Indian
wards of the government. It would seem, however, that even
federal agencies in the strictest sense are subject to assessments
for local improvements.
It is obvious that the existence of such a large amount of
non-taxable property is a distinct embarrassment to states like
Oklahoma which have many Indians within their borders. It might
perhaps have been better if the Court had not been quite so
stringent in its requirements as to the non-taxability of Indian
property. No one ought to desire any relinquishment of full
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protection of the'Indians, but it is questionable whether they benefit very much from some of the more extreme forms of tax
exemptions accorded to the lessees of their lands. But however
this may be, the problem should largely solve itself very soon.
The present policy of the Government is to do away, so far as
possible, with restrictions of all sorts on Indian property. Restrictions on local taxation of such property exist only for a
limited period, and the bulk of them will soon expire. No doubt
the federal government will still have to look after a considerable
number of Indians who cannot be educated in such a manner as- to
be able to take care of themselves. Perhaps arrangements can be
made to subject the lands of these incompetent Indians to local
taxation; at any rate, the burden upon the states should be greatly lessened when all except such incompetent Indians are subject to
local taxation. It may therefore be confidently expected that the
problem of the taxation-or perhaps better, lack of taxationof Indian property, now a very troublesome one, will rapidly
carry itself to a satisfactory practical solution.

